I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study a communication system in which an unauthorized intruder is able to intercept a subset of the transmitted symbols, and it is desired to maximize the intruder's uncertainty about the data without the use of an encryption key (either public or private).
Specifically, the encoder associates with the K-bit binary data sequence SK an N-bit binary "transmitted" sequence XN, where N > K. It is required that a decoder can correctly obtain SK with high probability by examining XN. The intruder can examine a subset of his choice of size p. ofthe N positions in XN, and the system designer's task is to make the intruder's equivocation (uncertainty) about the data as large as possible. The encoder is allowed to introduce randomness into the transformation SK _ X N, but we make the assumption that the decoder and the intruder must share any information about the encoding and the randomness. This assumption precludes the use of "key" cryptography, where the decoder has the exclusive possession of certain information.
As an example, suppose that K = 1, N = 2, and JL = 1. Let the data bit be S, and let~be a uniform binary random variable that is independent of S. Let X 2 = (~,~$ S), where $ denotes modulo 2 addition. If the intruder looks at either coordinate of X 2 , he gains no information about S, so that the system has perfect secrecy. The decoder, however, can obtain S by adding (modulo 2) the two components of X".
Our problem is to replicate this type of performance with large K, N, and JL. In fact, we assume that K~RN and JL~«N, where Rand a are held fixed and N becomes large. Roughly speaking, we show that perfect secrecy is attainable provided that JL is not too large, specifically JL ::s; N -K or a ::s; 1 -R. In Section II we give a precise statement and discussion of our problem and results, leaving the proofs for Sections III through V.
This problem is similar to the wire-tap channel problem studied in Ref. 1 . A special case of the problem studied there allows an intruder to examine a subset of the encoder symbols that is chosen at random by nature. In the present problem, the system designer must make the system secure against a more powerful intruder who can select which subset to examine.
II. FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND RESULTS
In this section we give a precise statement of our problem and state the results.
First a word about notation. Let~be an arbitrary finite set. Denote its cardinality by 1~I. Thus, the designer is assured that no matter what subset Y the intruder chooses, the intruder's remaining uncertainty about the source vector is at least Ll. When Ll = K, the intruder obtains no information about the source, and the system has attained perfect secrecy.
In this paper we study the trade-offs between K, N, Ll, and Ps, As we shall see, it will be useful to consider the normalized qualities K/N, u]N, and MK. Thus, K/N is the rate of the encoder equal to the number of data bits per encoded bit, Il/N is the fraction of the encoded bits that the intruder is able to observe, and Ll/K is the normalized entropy.
The intruder who observes Z N can reconstruct the data sequence SK with a per-bit-error probability of, say, P;. (1) will show in the sequel that (R, a, 0) is achievable for 0 S R, a S 1, and
A graph of the achievable (a, 0) pairs for fixed R is given in Fig. 1 .
The following theorem, a proof of which is given in Section III, is a "converse" result that gives a necessary condition on achievable codes. 
where h(X) = -x log X -(1 -X)log(l -X) is the binary entropy function.
Now if (R, a, 0) is achievable, for arbitrary E > 0, there must be an encoder/decoder with parameters N,
Applying Theorem 1 to this code yields
which is (1) as E -+ O. Thus conditions (1) are necessary for a triple to be achievable. Theorem 2, which is also proved in Section III, implies that (R, a, 0) is achievable if (1) is satisfied. A convenient way to partition 10, lIN is to let the sets IAml be the cosets of a group code G with N -K information symbols (so that G has 2 K cosets). Theorem 3, which is proved in Section IV, asserts that, in fact, we can do quite well with codes of this type. Theorem 3: If the triple (R, a, Cl) satisfies (1) , then it is achievable using an encoder/decoder derived from a group code.
The following simple lemma allows us to establish the achievability of all triples on the straight line of Fig. 1 
Remark: Inequality (3) can be rewritten as
from which we conclude that (R, alo~d is achievable implies that (R, a2, (h) is achievable where a2 2: al and
In particular, if al = 1 -R,~l = 1, theñ
Proof of Lemma 1: Let .9i k~k 11, 2, ... , NI, where
Then,
where the first equality follows from .51~5;1. Thus
from the definition of A. Minimizing (4) over all~, with I Yj! I = f.l2, yields (3) and the lemma. 0 Finally, we state a theorem that is a rather surprising strengthening of Theorem 2. Its proof is given in Section V.
exists an encoder/decoder with P; = 0 and 2.23
III. PROOF OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2
Assume that SK, X N, ZN, and S correspond to a source/encoder/ decoder as defined in Section II, with parameters K, N, A, and
making repeated use of the identity H(U, V) = H(U) + H(VI U), we obtain
where the last inequality follows from Fano's inequality (see Ref.
2).
Also, since H(X I Z) is the entropy of those N -f.l coordinates of X not specified by Z, we have
which is Theorem 1. We now give a proof of Theorem 2, which proceeds along the lines suggested in Section II. Let K, N be given, and let lAmI. Now let Z E 10, 1, ?IN be a possible value for the intruder's information, and let x E 10, liN. We say that z is "consistent" with x if z can be obtained from x by changing a subset of the coordinates of x to ?'s. Next, let L~1 be an integer to be chosen later. We say that a partition IAml is "good" if for all m(l -s m -s 2K) and all z E 10, 1, ?IN
If our encoder corresponds to a good partition for some L, then
and (6) Then, using 2 log e -s 3, we write for N~1,
Thus, there exists a good partition with L -s B + 1, and we conclude from (7) We now choose the partition at random with uniform distribution on the set of partitions of 10, liN into 2
The expectation in the right member of (11) is taken, as indicated, with z held fixed. Let us define the following quantities:
,
We now compute E4>(A m, z). The r members of Am are chosen at random from 10, liN (without replacement). The probability that exactly t members of Am belong to Q(z) is To see this, observe that there are (~) ways to choose the set Am.
The t members of Am that belong to Q(z) can be chosen in (~l) ways, and the remaining (r -t) members of Am can be chosen from the
Also, using (~l) -s nUt!, and
we have
If L satisfies (9), then E'lt < 1. Since 'It is integer valued, there must exist a particular partition, say lA::
This is our good partition. 0
IV. GROUP CODES AND THEOREM 3
In Sections II and III, we discussed how to construct encoder/ decoders based on a partition lAml of 10, lIN, In this section we consider the special case where the partition lAml is defined by a group code and its cosets.
Let H be a K x N parity-check matrix, which we assume has rank Since the number of solutions is N -Il -rank (Cl, ... , C N -I' ) ' and, given S = s, Z = z, all these solutions are equally likely, then (16) follows; hence the lemma. 0 Before continuing with the proof of Theorem 3, we digress to apply Lemma 4 in an example. Let K = 4, N = 8, and construct an encoder/ decoder using the self-dual Hamming code with block length 8 and four information digits and four check digits. Then, w = w' = 4, so
Lemma 4: When an encoder/decoder is constructed to correspondto the parity-check matrix H, then
Thus, the encoder/decoder is optimal for all a except Il = 4, when .:l is only one bit less than ideal.
We will establish Theorem 3 via a random code argument. Towards this end, we establish the following lemmas.
Lemma 5: Let 1 -s m -s n, and let the m X n matrix A over GF (2) . . . Begin at state O. With each choice of a column, advance one state if and only if this choice increases the dimension of the space spanned by the columns chosen so far. The rank of the matrix A is d(n) and is equal to the state at which we find ourselves after all n columns are chosen. Let r(k) denote the set of paths 1r that start at state 0 and
Now let the path 11" E r(k). This path contains exactly n -k selfloops, each of which has probability S 2-m + k • Thus, for 11" E r(k),
Pr11l"} s 2(-m+kHn-k).
Also, since I r(k) I = (~), eq. (18) yields
Since the exponent is nondecreasing in
which is Lemma 5. 0
Lemma 6: Let 1 S m S n, and let the m x n matrix A over GF (2) be chosen at random with uniform distribution on the set of 2 mn binary m x n matrices. Then
Proof of Lemma 6: Choose the rows of A sequentially. As in the proof of Lemma 5, the probability that the dimension of the space spanned by the first j rows is equal to j is
The rest of the lemma follows from In(1 -u)~-uj(1 -u) and e:"~1 -u.
We now turn to Theorem 3. Let R > 0 be given and held fixed. We will show that 0 = 1 and a = 1 -R is achievable, and the remainder of the theorem will follow from Lemma 1. Let E > 0 be arbitrary. We will show that there exists an encoder/decoder with parameters N,
We proceed as follows. Let H be a K x N parity-check matrix, and let L satisfy (19). Let D*(Il) correspond to H, and define
We must show that there exists an H with 4.>(H) = o. We can write
where and 4.>o(H) = {I, 0,
4.>(H, Y) = {~:
If we choose H = (C lt ... , CN) at random with uniform distribution on the set of 2
K .
N binary K X N matrices, then (21) yields
E'If(H):s L E4.>(H, Y) + E4.>o(H).
IYI-,.
Let 5 
Similarly, we can apply Lemma 6 with A = H, n = N, and m = K, to obtain
Since there are no more than 2 N subsets 5/, (22) through (24) 
Since L satisfies (19), the first term in the right member of (25) is less than 1/2. Furthermore, for N sufficiently large, the second term in (25) is also less than 1/2. Thus 
v. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We restate Theorem 4 here:
Theorem 4: For all K, N for which 1 -s K ::s N, and "" = N -K there exists an encoder/decoder pair for which error-free decoding is possible, and
In particular, as K and N grow at a fixed ratio (i.e., K = RN as N -+ 00), Ll can be made as close as we like to K -1. We shall use a random coding argument to prove Theorem 4. A code for this problem is a partition of all 2 N sequences into 2 K message "bins," each of size 2 N -K • Each message is transmitted by randomly choosing an element of the bin corresponding to the desired message, with all elements chosen equally likely. The ensemble of codes is the set of all partitions, chosen equally likely.
We shall obtain a lower bound on Ll as a function of the code selected and then show that the average (over the ensemble of codes) of Ll for any subset of "" bits selected is greater than K -1. We then obtain the variance (again, over the ensemble of codes) of the bound. Using the variance, we can invoke Chebyshev's inequality to bound the probability that the code yields Ll < K -1 -E for any positive E. Since the probability distribution over the code ensemble is uniform, this bound is the fraction of the number of all possible codes that fail to provide acceptable secrecy for the "" bits selected. Since there are a limited number of sets of "" bits [(~) to be precise], the total number of codes that fail to provide acceptable secrecy for any choice of "" bits can be bounded. The condition that the total number of such codes must be less than the number of codes in the ensemble, which guarantees the existence of a good code, yields the theorem.
While the proof as just outlined is conceptually simple, the mechanics (primarily the variance computation) are complicated, and are outlined in the Appendix.
We proceed: Let Y be an index set (of size N -K), which is a subset of 11, 2, '" , N}. Let Z be the observed vector resulting from observations of the positions of transmitted code word X with indices in Y: and let S be the message (we omit superscripts). Now (26) follows from applying the identities
H(A, B) = H(B, A) = H(B IA) + H(A).
By the construction of the code, all values of X are equally likely, so that all values of Z are as well, and (26) becomes
.:1=K-(N-K) +H(ZIS).
Let n(z, s) be the number of code words corresponding to message s that are consistent with z, for each sand z. Then,
since the total number of code words corresponding to s is 2
• z Clearly,
and the number of s is 2 K , so
We will lower bound a by using
which is true for any positive a. Therefore,
Since we have just shown that
Interpreted as a function of the randomly selected code, a b is a random variable. The expectation n 2(z, s) is constant for all z and s by the symmetry of the code selection, and
This bound is maximized by using a = n 2(z, s), which yields
The variance of a b can be written as
Denote the four generic (z, s) pairs by (1, 1) (1, 2) , (2, 1) , and (2, 2 
where T, (defined in the Appendix) is less than or equal to one. The right-hand side is maximized (over the allowable range of Td by T, = 1, so that 3 6.244
The mean of .:1t, is
Since (see the Appendix)
Chebyshev's inequality states - 
where h( . ) is the binary entropy function and IUyC(Y)1 < 6.244
2N(h(R)-l)
(30)
As long as the left-hand side of (30) -[C -n(l, 1) -n(2~1~~B_ n(l, 2) -n(2, 2)] , which is the product of the number of ways the elements consistent with Zl can be drawn, times the number of ways the elements consistent with Z2 can be drawn, times the number of ways the elements consistent with neither can be drawn. The denominator is just i.e., the number of ways that two arbitrary sets of size C can be drawn. The notation we have used is the standard trinomial coefficient:
defined to be zero when any of Y, Z or Y + Z are greater than X, or when any of X, Y,or Z are negative. Defining, for the sake of notational compactness, a~n(l, 1) (j~n(l, 2) -y~n (2, 1) 5~n (2, 2) , then (a~{j)(-Y~5)(C-a~;~B_ (j -5) P(a, (j, -y, 5 
